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Working methods 
I hope we’ll be able to obtain not ritually but substantially fruitful implications from 
this seminar discussing in a way as frank and informal as possible although it may be very 
difficult because of linguistic “ non-tariff “barriers. Anyway I believe the enthusiasm of our 
participants will rather easily overcome such a problem. You can speak in any language 
you like when you have something to say. Someone among us will voluntarily cooperate 
soon to translate what you have said. I really hope so. 
 
Backgrounds 
Now I want to explain very briefly what the seminar today is for. Almost two years 
ago, January 31st, 2002 the Department of public law at Florence University organized the 
1st Italo-Japanese Seminar on Political-Institutional Systems in transformation: in 
comparison between Japan and Italy. Prof.Fusaro and Prof.Toshiyasu Takahashi of 
Hiroshima Shudo University staying in sabbatical year at Florence promoted the seminar. 
Prof. Takahashi, Prof. Ikeya of Takushoku University and I on the Japanese part, other 
five Italian professors on the Italian counterpart read a paper. There was an extremely 
animated discussion because not only official members but also many researchers on the 
floor of other fields and from other countries like France, Spain and Mexico actively joined 
the discussion. 
Inspired by this experience, from the last academic year 2003 we organize a 
tentative research group in order to assess the possibility of the positively documented 
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study on the juristic-institutional transformations introduced during the transition from 
the so-called First to the Second Republic in Italy, obtaining research subsidies (which are 
ridiculously miserable) from the Ministry of Education and Science. Prof. Toshiyasu 
Takahashi, Prof.Suzuki of Kumamoto University and I participate the research project as 
an official member. Prof.Fusaro and Mr. Ashida, a research staff specialized on the Italian 
law at the National Diet Library and now being transferred to the Upper House collaborate 
it as an outside adviser.  
 
Aimes 
We intended to develop some key suggestions gotten from the 2002 seminar at 
Florence. We suppose, however, that it shall be more productive to canalize these 
suggestions into a more descriptive and fact-oriented documentation on each specific 
juristic-institutional transformation materialized during the transition in this decade 
rather than to concentrate upon analyses of various types of politico-ideological discourses 
treating on the ever-ongoing political reforms in Italy. After having accomplished this sort 
of basic documentation, then we’ll be able to reach a synthetic judgment on the Italian 
transition also in comparative perspectives with the Japanese case.    
 
Arguments 
(1) No less reform than transformation 
Here we want to stress the difference of meaning between two terms, the 
transformation and the reform: the reform can be defined as a product realized relevantly 
by intentional efforts of the interested actors, while the transformation can be considered 
as a both intentional and unintentional result of the more complex and concurrent process 
composed not only of the interested actors but also of overwhelmingly strong and binding 
structural agents as external constraints, that is “vincolo esterno” in Italian, as the 
European integration under the European Union or the rampant globalization principally 
guided by the market fundamentalism.  
For instance we know Italian governments have succeeded in realizing sound 
finance through restructuring the budget policy in this decade. Also the Japanese Board of 
Audit recently dispatched a research team to study on the secret of the Italian success in 
reducing the national accumulated debt. But it seems to be sure that if it had not been for 
external constraints imposed by the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, 
Italian governments could not have attained such a result. On this point we can refer to the 
titles of books as Salvati dall’Europa (Was Italy saved by Eu pe?) concerning the Italian 
social-labor policy mostly in terms of neo-corporatism supposed to be established during 
the transition written by Maurizio Ferrara & E.Gualmini (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999) and 
Condannata al successo? (Is Italy condemned to success by Europe?), an anthology treating 
ro
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on the Italian leopard-patterned innovations unevenly and incoherently introduced in 
various policy areas by the impacts derived from the European integration, edited by 
Giuseppe Di Parma et alibi (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000). They are very emblematic because 
of suggesting enormous external constraints originated by the European integration which 
were imposed upon the national decision making process in Italy. 
 
(2) Nonproductive electoral reform 
Thus we are interested less in reforms than in transformations introduced in the 
recent Italy. If we are right in making such a hypothesis, there will remain the decisive 
question about what a great effort for accomplishment of the politico-institutional reform 
enthusiastically supported by most of the Italian people meant. Both Italy and Japan 
almost simultaneously adopted the new mixed majoritarian-proportional electoral system 
that remained as an only effective product brought by a series of political reform 
movements in each country.  
The new mixed electoral system in turn has not yet brought as an alternating two 
party system of Westminster model as expected in both cases. In Japan the predominant 
party system of the Liberal Democratic Party barely manages to survive with the populist 
and demagogic mobilization strategy adopted by a popular Prime Minister, Junich Koizumi, 
a proponent of the contradictory anti-establishment radical reform of Japanese system 
including the LDP and the coalitional support given by the opportunistic Komei Party, the 
biggest nontraditional Buddhist-oriented religious party in fact led by a not entirely 
respectable charismatic leader, Daisaku Ikeda.  
In Italy the electoral reform has not brought a party realignment but a party 
deaignment. We find rather a distorted bipolar system composed of two ideologically 
long-distanced antagonistic coalition camps like the center-right coalition of parties called 
“Casa della Libertà” (the House of Liberty) and the center-left coalition of parties called 
“Ulivo”(the Olive Tree) than the bipartisan system as in the United Kingdom. And what 
was even worse, the new electoral system couldn’t stop fragmentation of the Italian party 
system but accelerated personalization of the Italian parties. In sum the electoral reform 
has brought a sui generis bipolar system of the Italian style without two big mass 
organized parties naturally to be necessary for an alternating two party system as 
expected. 
 
(3) Italian Anomaly Revived 
      Apart from the party dealignment, after the victory of the Casa della Libertà in the 
May 2001 general elections, we are witnessing an unimaginably more disastrous 
governance under the revived Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi than predicted. I don’t 
approve all of accusations pointed in an article entitled “Fit to run Italy” of The Economist 
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(April 28th, 2001) issued just before the election day.  
But this article was more convincing than the illustrated booklet of 127 pages 
entitled “Una storia i aliana”(An Italian story) about Berlusconi’s own self-praised success 
story that was distributed to fifteen million Italian homes before the election day because 
we can believe that these accusations were mostly proved by certificated data. The article 
begins as follows:  
t
“In any self-respecting democracy it would be unthinkable that the man assumed to 
be on the verge of being elected prime minister would recently have come under 
investigation for, among other things. Money-laundering, complicity in murder, connections 
with the Mafia, tax evasion and bribing of politicians, judges and the tax police (…) 
Mr.Berlusconi is not fit to lead the government of any country, least of all one of the world’s 
richest democracies.” 
I can’t afford the time nor the space to analyze the anomaly of Berlusconi’s 
governance in detail. So I’d like to point out only some symptoms peculiar to this anomaly.  
a) Unrestricted deregulation introduced in economic activities in markets 
according to the peculiar (especially Minister of Economy Giulio Tremonti’s) 
interpretation about neo-liberalism (e.g. the exemption of tax evasion and 
illegal constructions in exchange for payments of a certain amount of fine; the 
de-penalization of making false balance sheets;). 
b) Personal patrimonialization of legal due process (Lex ad personam: the Law 
n.248 of November 7th 2002 called the Legge Cirami that revised the due 
process of law only to save Berlusconi’s own legal adviser, a member of the 
Representative House, Cesare Previti from condemnation for bribery; the Law 
n.140 of June 20th 2003 that supposed to block all trials of the Prime Minister 
Berlusconi in office; the reform of judicial system to subordinate the judicial 
power to the legislative power controlled by Berlusconi’s majority). 
c) Monopolizing privatization of the national mass media system (the Law n.112 
of April 29th 2004 called the Legge Gasparri that enabled Berlusconi to 
continue to monopolize the major national commercial television networks; also 
the administrative committee of the RAI (the Italian Public Broadcasting) is 
strongly controlled by the government. Thus Berlusconi is de facto 
monopolizing both public and private national TV networks). 
d) Legalization of unconstitutional constitution for realizing his personal 
ambition to establish the Caesarean cleptocacy as the accomplishment of 
transition to the Second Republic (Revising the second part of the Constitution, 
in exchange for conceding the “devolution” to a rebellious coalition partner, the 
secessionist Northern League (Lega Nord) of Umberto Bossi, Berlusconi will be 
able to obtain the extremely empowered premiership based on the direct 
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popular election. Recently also Giovanni Sartori, a filo conservative leading 
figure in the Italian academy of political science, severely criticized this project 
because of denying the fundamental principle of constitutionalism in the 
appendix to the 5th revised edition of Ingegneria costituzionale comparata (The 
Compara ive Constitutional Eng neering) (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004), entitled 
“Verso una costituzione incostituzionale”(Towards an unconstitutional 
constitution). We can assume his ultimate ambition may be to establish the 
Caesarean cleptocacy. The cleptocacy is defined as the ultimate form of political 
corruption in the Enciclopedia della Sicenze Sociali, vol.IX (Roma, Istituto della 
Enciclopedia Treccani, 2001) by Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci. 
The adjective Caesarean is cited from Piccolo Cesare (A Little Caesar) of 
Giorgio Bocca(Milano, Feltrinelli, 2003). 
t i
 
Questions 
       Perhaps I’m exaggerating a bit, but it is like that. I don’t intend to excessively 
demonize Berlusconi’s government from the partisan point of view but I can’t conceal my 
profound uneasiness at recent vicissitudes in the Italian politics. After 10 years, I wonder 
what such feverish reform movements as making a hasty American scholar write a book 
entitled The Italian Revolution has brought to the Italian society. What did the Clean 
Hands Investigations mean? Have Italians really cleaned up political corruptions? Have 
Italians already shut out the organized crimes of Mafia, Camorra and ‘ndragheta once 
profoundly penetrated into the Italian civil society? Can we get rid of the concepts like 
amoral familism, clientelismo, lottizazione, trsformismo from the glossary on the Italian 
political culture? I think it’s difficult to answer in the affirmative. Well I’d like to conclude 
my introduction posing the last question. Why the constitutional revision is necessary for 
Italians now? 
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